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LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENT ON THE JUDICIAL POWER-The judicial
power, in this country, is always based on a constitutional provision. Since the
legislative power has the same basis, and the judiciary decide cases according to
the substantive law enacted by the legislature, it is obvious that the legislature
has some power in respect to the judiciary. But since both powers are creatures
of the same organic law in which the powers are separated, it also follows that
there are powers resident in a court which cannot be disturbed by legislative
action. This hazy line of demarcation constitutes the boundary beyond which lies
legislative encroachment on the judiciary.
The courts vary widely with the constitutions to which they owe their exist-
ence; but as the state constitutions, having been patterned after the Federal
Constitution, conform in the use of the doctrine of separation of powers, and
other legal incidents, so their judicial establishments conform to a sufficient
standard to permit of classification. They may be classified for convenience in
handling as follows:
I. Constitutional Courts. These include all courts specifically provided for
by the constitution itself, or by legislative act under a specific power granted by
the constitution. These may be subdivided into:
(a) Courts specifically named by the constitution, and given an express
jurisdiction (and occasionally express powers).
(b) Courts specifically named by the constitution, the jurisdiction and
powers of which are to be provided by legislative action.
(c) Courts established by the legislature under a general power to establish
"inferior courts".
II. Legislative Courts. These include all courts created by the legislature
under some type of "enabling clause", in order more efficiently to discharge some
specific power given by the constitution; and also all courts created by the legisla-
ture as a function of absolute sovereignty.
Courts of class I (a), usually the courts of last resort of their respective
jurisdictions, are quite common in the state systems. Their part in this discussion
is very brief. If the constitution does not fix the number of judges in such a
court, it can be changed at will by the legislature.' But such a court cannot be
abolished,' nor can its jurisdiction be alteed;' and it endures in its prescribed
form, as does the legislature, so long as does the constitution, on which both
depend for their lan vital.
A real problem presents itself, however, in regard to courts of classes I (b),
I (c), and II. To varying extents these courts are creatures of the legislative
will. To what extent can the legislature validly alter its will with respect to
courts of these classes already in existence? Can they be abolished? If so, must
they be replaced? Can they be deprived of jurisdiction? If so, must that juris-
diction be vested in other courts?
The majority of the courts of this country fall Within the three last named
classes. The federal judicial system has but one court of class I (a), the re-
mainder of its courts falling into classes I (c), and II. In the state systems,
' This has been done to the United States Supreme Court frequently. The judiciary Act
of 1789, I STAT. 73 (789) provided for six justices, 2 STAT. 89 (180i) reduced the number
to four. It was immediately restored to six by 2 STAr. 132 (i802) ; raised to seven by 2
STAT. 420 (807) § 5; raised to nine by 5 STAT. 176 (837) ; raised to ten by 12 STAT. 794
(1863) ; reduced to seven by 14 STAT. 209 (1866) ; raised once more to nine, at which num-
ber it has since remained, by i6 STAT. 44 (x869), 28 U. S. C. §326 (1926) ; 36 STAT. 1152
(1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 321 (1928).2Hildreth's Heirs v. M'Intire's Devisee, i J. J. Mar. 2o6 (Ky. 1829).
3 Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 49 (U. S. 1803).
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courts of classes I (a) and I (b) are much more common; the extreme instances
being found in Louisiana 4 and Maryland, 5 where all of the courts, down to and
including the justice's courts are of class I (a). But even in the state systems
courts of classes I (a) and I (b) are in the minority. Thirty-nine 8 of the state
constitutions provide for the establishment of courts of class I (c). All states,
of course, can establish courts of class II.
Beyond the questions of existence and jurisdiction is the question of how far
the legislature can go before it encroaches on the very existence and exercise of
the power confided in the judicial department of government. This limitation on
legislative power exists only in the implications of "judicial pover" and "court"
normally the only definitive words used in vesting the power.7 "Judicial Power",
we are told, means the common law power of deciding and enforcing the decision
over disputed matters.8 "Court", as defined by Lord Chief Justice Coke, means
9
a place where justice is judicially administered."
James Wilson, in his law lectures at the University of Pennsylvania in 1790,10 is
clearer in his definition:
"A court is a tribunal established by law, with the power to hear con-
troversies between persons, and administer relief or punishment in accord-
ance with established rules of law."
Both of these definitions, however, assume the legal tribunal. What is the nature
of this tribunal? Are there rights and powers appertaining to its very existence?
If there are, the use of the word "court" in the constitutions would, in these
rights and powers, set a boundary beyond which the legislature could not go, for
any alteration of the rights and powers in such a case would alter the body so that
it would no longer satisfy the definitive word.
The first elements of a court which seem certain are its existence, and its
jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal government is vested by the Con-
stitution 11 in "one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish". The legislative and executive
powers are self-executory since elections are provided for; but it should be noted
that the judicial power must be set in motion by the other departments of govern-
ment. This difference is expressed in justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in
Chisholm v. Georgia.12  The justice mentions that on this point, which was not
mentioned by the other members of the court, he is taking issue with Randolph,
ILA. CONST. (1913) art. 84 to art. i56.
'MD. CONST. (1867) art. IV, pts. I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
'ALA. CONST. (igoi) art. VI, § 139; ARIZ. CONST. (912) art. VI; CAL. CONST. (I879)
art. VI; COLO. CONST. (1876) art. VI; CONN. CONST. (1828) art. V; DEL. CONST. (1897)
art. IV; GA. CONST. (1877) art. VI, § I; IDAHO CON ST. (1889) art. V, § 3; ILL. CONST.
(1870) art. VI; INn. CONST. (1851) art. VII, § I; IowA CONST. (1857) art. V, § I; KAN.
CONST. (859) art. III, § I; ME. CONST. (I819) art. VI, § 1; MASS. CONST. (1780) pt. II,
c. III; MIcH. CONST. (i908) art. VII, § I (two-thirds vote required) ; MINN. CONST. (1857)
art. VI, § I (two-thirds vote required); MONT. CONST. (1889) art. VIII, § I; NEB. CONST.
(1875) art. V, § I; NEV. CONST. (1864) art. VI, § I; N. H. CONST. (I912) pt. II, art. 4;
N. J. CONST. (1844) art. VI, § I; N. M. CoNsT. (1912) art. VI, § I; N. Y. CONST. (894)
art. VI, §§ I, 2; N. C. CONST. (1868) art. IV, § 2; N. D. CONST. (889) art. IV, § 85; OHIO
CONST. (1912) art. IV, § I (municipal courts only); OKLA. CONST. (1907) art. VII, § I;
ORE. CONST. (1857) art. VII, § I; PA. CONST. (1874) art. V, § I; R. I. CONST. (1842) art.
X, § I; S. D. CONST. (1889) art. V, § I; TENN. CONST. (1870) art. VI, § i; TEx. CoNsT.
(876) art. V, § I; UTAH CoNsT. (1895) art. VIII, § I; VT. CoNs?. (1913) § 29 (equity
courts only); WASH. CONST. (1889) art. IV, § I; W. VA. CONST. (1872) art. VIII, § I;
WIs. CONST. (1848) art. VII, § 2; WYO. CONST. (1889) art. V, § I.
7U. S. CONS?. (1787) Art. III, Sec. I; and the state constitutions cited supra note 6.
8 See Huddart & Co. v. Moorehead, 8 Com. L. R. 330, 335 if., 381 ff. (Australia, i9O9).
i Co. INST. *58.
0 2 WILSON'S WORKS (Andrew's ed. 1896) 75.
31Supra note 7.
22 Dall. 419, 432 (U. S. i793).
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who was of counsel, the very man who proposed the judicial provision in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.13 Justice Iredell's concept is that federal
courts must receive not only their organization as to the number of judges, but
all of their authority from the legislature.
In the federal system of courts, the only court of class I (a) is the Supreme
Court. It seems to be assumed that this court could not be abolished by Con-
gressional action. There is not even a dictum on the point. There are no courts
of class I (b), the remainder being of class I (c) and class II. The courts of
class I (c) can be abolished by the Congress. This was done to the old circuit
courts established by the act of 1789.14 Justice Story in his opinion in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee"5 says that in such a case Congress must establish new courts
so that all of the judicial power shall at all times be vested. Courts of class II
exist subject to the will of the legislature which created them. The legislative
body may even require such a court to give advisory opinions.1"
Since the judicial power must be set in motion by Congress, and all but one
of our federal courts may be abolished by Congress, the obvious question would
seem to be: Must Congress establish courts? Justice Story met this question in
his opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,17 and restated his concept in his treatise
many years later."' Reasoning from the appearance of the words "shall be
vested" in the sections governing each of the three powers, he concludes that
these words are mandatory, and therefore the whole judicial power must at all
times be vested in some courts by Congress.19
The case of Marbury v. Madison 20 established the principle that the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be altered by Congress. There is no
apparent bar to vesting a concurrent original jurisdiction in the inferior courts by
Congressional act, however."2
In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 a provision
2 2 was proposed ex-
pressly authorizing Congress to confer jurisdiction as it saw fit on the inferior
courts. It was stricken out, in a subsequent session, by unanimous vote.
23 Today
the situation coincides with the rejected proposal. The authority of Congress in
creating courts and conferring on them all, or little, or much of the judicial power
is unlimited. 4 The jurisdiction of the inferior courts is subject to and based
upon Congressional statutes.2 5  However, there is one inexplicably anomalous
principle: the determination of the nature and extent of the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction is for the court."8 No explanation for the distinction is made
by the courts. Presumably it is because of the international nature of the subject
matter. In a modern case, Den ex dem. Murray v. The Hoboken Improvement
2 JOURNAL OF THE FEERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (879) 69.
1436 STAT. i167 (ign).
i Wheat. 304, 329-331 (U. S. I816).
26Fidelity National Bank v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 134, 47 Sup. Ct. 511, 514 (1926);
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 509 (3927).
" Slepra note 15.
3B STRYa, CoNsT1UTIoN (5th ed. 189) §§ 16o9, 1692, 1696. In concluding that all of the
judicial power must be vested at all times, Story is obviously making too broad a statement,
since under the Judiciary Act of 1789, which governed the operation of the Court of which
he was a member, that portion of the judicial power which included claims under $5oo was
not vested.
Supra note 15.
Supra note 3.
= Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 81g, 821 (U. S. 1824) ; United States v.
Ravara, 2 Dail. 297 (U. S. C. C. 1793).
. JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 226.
2 Id. at 300.
United States v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 6o2 ff. (1878); Railroad Co. v.
Mississippi, Io2 U. S. 135, 140 (i88o).
McNally v. Jackson, 7 F. (2d) 373 (E. D. La. x925) ; Heine v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 50 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
The Lottawanna, 2r Wall. 558 (U. S. 1874).
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Co.," there is an interesting bit of dictum to the effect that Congress cannot
withdraw the subject matter of a suit at common law, equity or admiralty from
the jurisdiction of the federal courts; nor place within it subject matter not falling
within those classifications. The language is obviously far too broad. It is a
long recognized principle that Congress can withdraw from the jurisdiction of the
court matter then pending before it which was of proper judicial cognizance when
the action was instituted.2 s The Constitutional jurisdictional limitations mark the
extreme boundaries beyond which Congress may not pass in vesting jurisdiction.
9
Courts of class II are subject to Congressional will in its untrammeled exercise
of a right of sovereignty in the assignment of jurisdiction."0
The state decisions on the existence and jurisdiction of state courts follow
very closely the expressions in the federal cases. The cases are far more common
in the state courts, however, since the legislatures seem fond of experiment.
In courts of class I (a), the court itself cannot be abolished.31 The same is
true of courts of class I (b), which are extremely common in the state systems.
The cases uniformly hold that such courts cannot be abolished nor rendered
impotent by the legislature. 32 Courts of class I (c) may be abolished at will just
as in the federal system.3
Are these provisions (where the constitution as in Louisiana or Pennsylvania
provides for an entire scheme of courts) exclusive, so that judicial power may not
be vested other than in these courts? The question arises most frequently under
a statute creating a morals court, juvenile court, or municipal court. Some cases
have held such provisions to be exclusive ;s4 but generally the authority to estab-
lish additional courts of class II is admitted, 35 either under an enabling clause or
under the general power of sovereignty.
The jurisdiction which is subject to being vested in these state courts, it is
well to remember, is not the constitutionally limited jurisdiction found in the
federal judicial power, but the plenary, vigorous judicial power of the sovereign."
6
The jurisdiction of courts of class I (a) cannot be affected by legislation.
37
The jurisdiction of courts of class I (b), 3s class I (c) 11 and class II 40 can be
altered by the legislature as it sees fit.
It is evident, therefore, that to varying extents all courts are creatures of
legislative will, and to such extent subject to variations in that will. Their exist-
ence and jurisdiction are provided for in the various ways we have discussed by
the constitution itself. The line of demarcation, then, in this phase of the prob-
lem, is clear. In so far as the constitution provides, the courts are protected as
to existence and jurisdiction. There are no implications in this phase and there
is no legislative encroachment until the legislature contravenes an express consti-
tutional provision.
I8 Howard 272, 274 (U. S. 1855).
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 26o U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 (1922).
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1926) ; Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 5o Sup. Ct. 389 (1929).
° American Ins. Co. v. Canter, i Pet. 581, 546 U. S. (3828) ; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U. S. 438, 449, 49 Sup. Ct. 411, 412 (1928).
1 Hildreth's Heirs v. M'Intire's Devisee, supra note 2; Clements v. Roberts, 144 Tenn.
852, 238 S. W. 902 (I92O) ; Klein v. Valerius, 87 Wis. 54. 57 N. W. i882 (1894).
2 Ex Parte Richmond, Iii Tex. Cr. 446, 14 S. W. (2d) 85i (1929).
State v. Gunter, I7O Ala. 165, 54 So. 283 (19H).
3 Gibson v. Emerson, 7 Ark. 172 (846) ; State v. Maynard, 14 Ill. 419 (1853).
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (U. S. I8O7). Burke v. St. Paul, Minn., etc., Ry.,
35 Minn. 172, 28 N. W. i9o (1886); State v. New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L. 5i (i88o) ; Gerlach
v. Moore, 243 Pa. 603, go Atl. 399 (914).
RosE, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 193), 7-10.
27Supra note 31.
Supra note 32.
Supra note 33.
Larkin v. Simmons, 155 Ala. 273, 46 So. 451 (I9
o8) ; People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204
N. Y. 478, 97 N. E. 850 (1912).
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Are there other powers, however, which are implied in the judiciary, so that
legislation interfering with such powers would be unconstitutional as a legislative
encroachment in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers? The exist-
ence of such powers is recognized uniformly by both state 
41 and federal courts. 42
They are labeled variously as general, plenary, implied or inherent powers; and are
conceived of as springing into full being with the inception of the court itself and
enduring so long as the court does. These powers not having been given by the
legislature, are not subject to its control, even in the extreme case of courts of
class II.
The most fundamental of these powers is the contempt power. This has
been treated so ably elsewhere 43 that no attempt will be made to deal with it here.
The making of rules of court would seem to be a fundamental power of the
court to control its own procedure. Only two courts 44 subscribe to that view;
and one 45 of those limits its support to rules of the supreme court. The supreme
court of that state is a court of class I (a)
46 and since the decision is based on
that constitutional ground it has no bearing in a discussion of inherent power.
The usual statement of the rule by state
4 7 and federal48 courts is that the court has
the power to make rules of court so long as they do not conflict with statutory or
organic law.49  The power is the same over courts of equity as over courts of
law; ° and extends to the very writs by which appeals are taken.
51 But when
rules of court have been adopted by the court in conformity with the above prin-
ciple, the court can suspend the operation of the rules to do justice in a particular
case.52 Where the legislature enacts rules of court it is not clear that such rules
are ipso facto valid and binding on the court. If the legislative rule affects the
exercise of judicial discretion, it is invalid as an encroachment in contravention
of the separation of powers. This occurs most frequently where a statute limits
the time for trial and for consideration of an appeal,
53 or, as in one case, where a
statute makes the granting of a certiorari automatic if the court has not announced
a decision on the petition within a limited time.
5 4
The power to decide the case on the facts and law as existing at the time
seems to be of the essence of the judicial process. It has been held, however, that
the legislature can withdraw jurisdiction (in the classes of courts where it can
41 Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. ioi8 (1929) ; Mulligan
v. Mulligan, 31 Ohio C. C. 89 (igIO).
'Ex porte Bollaman, supra note 35; Anderion v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821);
Strohbar v. Dwinnill, 29 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
'Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in crininal contempts
in "Inferior" Pederal Court-A Study in Separation of Powers (924) 37 HARv. L. Ray.
ioio; Note (930) 2 RocKY MT. L. REv. 115; Legis. (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 68.
"Sydney v. Auburndale Constr. Co., 96 Fla. 688, 1g. So. 128 (1928) ; State v. Ward, 184
N. C. 618, 113 S. E. 775 (1922).
State v. Ward, supra note 44.
N. C. CONST. (1876) art. IV, §§ 2, 3, 4.
' Upshaw v. State, ii Ala. App. 3u0, 66 So. 821 019W4); Traffic Sales Co. v. Justice's
Ct., 192 Cal. 377, 220 Pac. 3o6 (1923) ; Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Co. 381, 176 Pac. 479
(igi8); Keen v. State, 89 Fla. 113, 103 So. 399 (1925) ; Mynor v. Hammar Bros., i73 Ill.
App. 507 (1912) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Surprise, 53 Ind. App. 286, 97 N. E. 357 (1912) 
;
Caldwell v. Cockrell, 280 Mo. 269, 217 S. W. 524 (1919) ; Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Genesee
Recreation Co., io1 Misc. 44o, i67 N. Y. Supp. 141 (1917) ; Equipment Co. v. Primos
Vanadium Co., 285 Pa. 432, 132 AtI. 360 (1926); Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114
S. E. 369 (1922).
Is Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. i (U. S. 1825) ; United States Bank v. Halstead, io
Wheat. 5I (U. S. 1825).
"Keen v. State, supra note 47.
CO Rifle Potato Growers' Co-op. Soc. v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925).
Wayman v. Southard, supra note 48.
52 Strohbar v. Dwinnell, stpra note 42.
Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 Pac. 495 (1926) ; Waterbury v.
Nassor, 130 Misc. 200, 224 N. Y. Supp. 179 (927).
" Holliman v. State, i65 S. E. ii (Ga. 1932).
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be done at all) from a court even pending the appeal of a case within the juris-
diction affected, which was properly within the subject jurisdiction when the
action was commenced.55 That decision stands as a landmark in this field of law
today. It seems unfortunate that the case should have arisen under the circum-
stances in which it did, so that the decision was actually forced on the court by
political expediency in the face of the situation following the Civil War, because
the decision is entirely out of line with the general trend of legal decisions in this
field. Several courts have held that the legislature may, by a curative act, validate
a bond issue,5 6 or an illegal contract,5 7 pending the appeal of an action based on
the obligation. In each of these cases, however, the legislature was merely cor-
recting an error of omission of its own by supplying the legislative authority, for
want of which the obligation was a nudium pactum. In the preceding case, how-
ever, the legislature is not perfecting rights imperfect because of its own act, but
destroying rights fully and properly acquired. There is a strong distinction.
Otherwise the authorities are uniform. If the question is a judicial one arising
under the substantive law, its decision is reserved for the judiciary.5 In
reaching that decision the legislature has some control over the law of evidence,
but other than that it can assume no power. As to the respective functions of
court and jury, they remain as they were at common law, and a statute which
attempts to vest the normal function of the court on the jury is invalid as a vio-
lation of the implied power to determine the law in making the decision. 5 Some
legislatures have attempted to prescribe the weight to be given the finding of facts.
These statutes have been held invalid, in the same way. 0 Similarly the legisla-
ture cannot take from a court of equity its power to determine the issues of both
fact and law.0 ' There have also been statutes providing that the court may not
direct a verdict after a jury has been drawn. They have failed on the same
ground. 2  After judgment has been rendered in a particular case, some legisla-
tures have attempted to vacate,83 or overrule 6 the judgment, or to grant a new
trial.65 In each of these cases the statute has been held invalid as a contravention
of some inherent power of the court essential to the exercise of a proper judicial
discretion.
Marbury v. Madison 6 is the milestone in constitutional law which estab-
lishes the doctrine of judicial review. The state courts have enthusiastically
adopted this position 67 (and in fact, in a few of them, 8 the doctrine antedates
Marbury v. Madison). By judicial review, of course, the judiciary performs an
action, which, by some, is regarded as an encroachment on the legislative branch;
and the legislative branch has, at times, tried to prevent this. Uniformly the
courts hold such statutes void as attacks upon an inherent power of the judiciary.
0
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 1868).
Camp v. State, 71 Fla. 381, 72 So. 483 (1916) ; Worley v. Idleman, 285 Ill. 214, 12o N
E. 472 (igi8).
v-Kennedy v. Meyer, 259 Pa. 3o6, 103 Atl. 44 (1918).
m Ex parte Tillman, 84 S. C. 552, 66 S. E. 1049 (19i9); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Phila--
delphia County, 220 Pa. oo, 68 Atl. 676 (19o8) semble.
"Kiley v. Chicago, Milw. & St. P. Ry. Co., 138 Wis. 215, iig N. W. 309 (19o9).
0 Brown v. Buck, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827 (889).
" Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403, 72 So. 52 (1916) ; State v. Aetna Ins. Co., 84 Fla. 123,
92 So. 871 (1922).
Thoe v. Chicago, MilW. & St. P. Ry., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W. 407 (,923).
Wilcox v. Miner, 201 Iowa 476, 2o5 N. W. 847 (1926).
6'People v. Clark, 300 Ill. 583, 133 N. E. 247 (921).
Merrill v. Sherburne, i N. H. 199 (1818).
Supra note 3.
United States v. Salberg, 287 F. 208 (N. D. Ohio 1923) ; Public Service Comm. v. Sun
Cab Co., 16o Md. 476, 154 AtI. 1oo (1931) ; Gill v. Goldfield Mines Co., 43 Nev. 1, 176 Pac.
784 (IgX); Baird v. Burke Co., 53 N. D. 140, 205 N. W. 17 (1925); People v. Ganly, 218
N. Y. 749, 113 N. E. 1o63 (1916) ; Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 388, io6 S. E. 403 (1921).
Holmes v. Walton, 4 Am. Hist. Rev. 456 (N. J. 1780).
State v. Maine Cent. R- R., 77 N. H. 425, 92 AtI. 837 (1914).
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Only one case seems to be contra the weight of authority, and in that case the
desired construction was embodied in the statute by the legislature. 0 Such a
construction is no construction at all, but part of the substantive law. It does
not curb the power of judicial review; and by that power the construction or any
portion of the statute containing it could be declared unconstitutional by the
court if it conflicted with the organic law.
The cases are substantially agreed upon the proposition that the legislature
may enact rules of evidence, usually expressed as presumptions, so long as the
presumptions are reasonable and not conclusive. 7' The provision that they must
be reasonable is another indication of the policy to protect judicial discretion;
but as to the prohibition against conclusive statutory presumptions, the rule seems
to have no valid basis. A conclusive presumption is merely a device for stating
the substantive law. The legislature can change the substantive law by an open,
positive enactment. It seems groundless then, to refuse to permit the legislature
to state a change in the substantive law by means of the language of presumption.
Historically the court has determined the punishment to be applied on a
finding of guilty in a criminal case. Modem penology, since the work of Goring 72
has discredited this method of sentencing. Dissatisfaction has also been expressed
by judges of lower courts who are required to impose the sentences. 3 The result
has been, in some states, passage of Indeterminate Sentence Acts, and Habitual
Criminal Acts. These acts take the sentencing power away from the court, in the
former by vesting the sentencing power in an administrative board, and in the
latter by compelling the court to impose a heavy penalty on a certain class of
offenders, deemed habitual, regardless of the nature of the crime for which the
present trial is being had. These acts have been held valid in practically every
state in which they have been passed,74 although there seems to be no doubt that
they deprive the court of the exercise of its judicial discretion in sentencing.
When judgment has once been pronounced, however, the court has an inherent
power to enforce that judgment of which the legislature cannot deprive it.7"
The power to admit to practice before the court and to disbar, is usually held
to be purely a judicial function,7 6 since the attorney is an officer of the court, a
member of the judicial branch, and subject only to judicial control.77  Many
statutes have been passed on the subject and many and divers have been the
opinions of the courts with reference to this power. Only one jurisdiction holds
that the legislature can compel the admission of one who has not complied with
"' Bettenbrock v. Miller, 85 Ind. 6oo, 112 N. E. 771 (igi6).
" Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. 204 (1922); Shamlian v. Equitable Acc.
Co., 226 Mass. 67, 115 N. E. 46 (917) ; Garron v. Steamboat Canal Co., 43 Nev. 298, i85 Pac.
Soi (1g91) ; Caffee v. State, ii Okla. Cr. 485, 148 Pac. 68o (1915) ; Commonwealth v. Ber-
ryman, 72 Pa. Super. 479 (1919); State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, ii9 Pac. 1o23 (191i).
' GoaRNG, ENGLisH CoNvicr, A STATxSICA . STUDY (1913).
7 Horace Stern, Judge of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, in the
Phila. Evening Bulletin, Dec. 14, 1932, at 14.
7 Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S. E. 76 (1929) ; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky.
341, i32 S. W. 557 (igio); People v. Cook, 147 Mich. 127, i1o N. W. 514 (19o7); State v.
Dugan, 84 N. J. L. 603, 89 Atl. 691 (1913) aff'd in 85 N. J. L. 731, 90 Ad. 287 (1914) ; Com-
monwealth v. McKenty, 52 Pa. Super. 332 (1913) ; Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 Pac. 67
(1917).
5In re Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 61o, 94 N. E. 852 (191i) ; State v. Bank of
Minatore, 242 N. W. 278 (Neb. 1932) ; Smith v. Washington Ins. Co., 11o N. J. Eq. 122, 159
At. 510 (1932) ; Underhill v. Schenck, 205 App. Div. 182, 199 N. Y. Supp. 6II (1923).
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the formal requirements. 8 Other courts have vigorously denied such a power
to admit or reinstate.79 Most of the statutes merely define the minimum require-
ments, and the courts admit a legislative power to set up minimum requirements.
8 0
These decisions are illogical, as they first postulate a statement of an implied
power in the ccurt to admit and disbar, and then acknowledge a right in the
legislature to set up minimum requirements. The more logical view, as taken by
one court,"' is that the court defers to the statute merely out of comity. The
statutes involved, in all except that case, simply provide minimum requirements
which the court would have used as a minimum in any event. The court is under
no compulsion to accept those who meet the minimum. Such acknowledgment
of a statute which does not bind the court is scarcely a denial of an inherent
power to admit and disbar.
In addition courts have miscellaneous inherent powers, necessary to the
proper and efficient discharge of their duties. The court has the power to investi-
gate crime; and the legislature may not interfere, nor make such investigation,
unless as a basis for legislation. 2 The court has inherent power to make such
orders as are necessary to the dispatch of business,8 3 to correct records at any
and all times so that the record will speak the truth, 4 to replace lost records,
5
to modify judgment,8 6 to control the order of business, 7 to adjourn from day to
day,8 to appoint necessary assistants and order them paid," to make rules gov-
erning the conduct of counsel, 0 to purchase necessary furniture,
1 to control the
use of the court house and its appurtenances,9 2 and to incur and order paid bills
for the proper care of jurors, who, in the best interests of justice are detained
over night.9 '
. These decisions show an interesting trend. The older decisions, and all of
those modern decisions on statutes aimed to strip the judiciary of power solely
for the benefit of the legislature, jealously guard the inherent powers of the
judiciary. The modern decisions which are concerned, however, with legislative
experiments in the field of social legislation, such as acts establishing Juvenile
Courts, or Morals Courts, or Habitual Criminal Acts, or Indeterminate Sentence
Acts, are, on the other hand, most liberal in construing valid these acts which
remove just as much inherent power. This course of action has given society the
benefit of modern social control agencies while retaining the judicial establish-
ment, as provided by the constitution, independent of legislative control by means
of the doctrine of the separation of powers. . . L.
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